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Abstract
This paper contributes to the growing literature that identiﬁes and measures the impact of
social context on individual economic behavior. We develop a model of housing demand with
neighborhood eﬀects and neighborhood choice. Modelling neighborhood choice is of fundamental
importance in estimating and understanding endogenous and exogenous neighborhood eﬀects. That
is, to obtain unbiased estimates of neighborhood eﬀects, it is necessary to control for non-random
sorting into neighborhoods.
Estimation of the model exploits a unique data set of household data that has been augmented
with contextual information at two diﬀerent levels (“scales”) of aggregation. One is at the neigh-
borhood cluster level, of about ten neighbors, with the data coming from a special sample of the
American Housing Survey. A second level is the census tract to which these dwelling units belong.
Tract-level data are available in the Summary Tape Files of the decennial Census data. We merge
these two data sets by gaining access to conﬁdential data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Our results for the neighborhood choice model indicate that individuals prefer to live near others
like themselves. Our estimates of the housing demand equation do conﬁrm that neighborhood eﬀects
are important. Neighborhood choice appears to be associated with the following diﬀerences, when
it is accounted for relative to when it is not, as in earlier work. First, there is a smaller endogenous
social eﬀect: the elasticity of housing demand with respect to mean neighbors’ demand is 0.6244
instead of 0.660 in earlier work. Second, there is a larger contextual eﬀect: the elasticity of housing
demand with respect to mean neighbors’ income is 0.2600 instead of 0.175.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: R21, C31.
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U.S. income inequality in the 1990s has led, among other reasons, to a new concern with measuring
the impact of social context on economic behavior, often referred to as “social eﬀects.” One
important component of social eﬀects is the impact of one’s place of residence, or neighborhood
eﬀects. Desirable social interactions and beneﬁcial local community “social capital” are known to
be features of neighborhood or residential communities. The rich may keep getting richer because
they beneﬁt from a better social environment than do poorer individuals.
Decisions about whether or not to move, where to locate and how much housing to consume will
be inﬂuenced generally by a perception of the behavior and characteristics of current and potential
neighbors. The link between place of residence and economic outcomes as an explanation for the
persistence (and even increase) of income inequality in the U.S. is a popular area of both theoretical
and empirical research. Yet, we still do not understand fully the decision of where to live and the
factors households typically take into consideration in making this decision.
The results of this research have important policy implications. For example, aﬀordable housing
policy has evolved from the time when huge complexes were built in poor parts of U.S. cities to
a contemporary interest in such policies as housing vouchers and the requirement that, in many
aﬄuent towns and cities, a certain percentage of the total housing stock must be aﬀordable housing.
This evolution of policy thinking is consistent with the idea that neighborhood eﬀects are important
determinants of economic wellbeing. The aﬀordable housing experiment that is known as “Moving
To Opportunity” [ Katz et al. (2000) ] is a speciﬁc example of a program that attempts to measure
the impact of households that move from poor neighborhoods to more economically advantaged
areas.
In this paper, we emphasize the role of neighborhood eﬀects in inﬂuencing households’ residential
location decisions and how such decisions aﬀect, in turn, neighborhood eﬀects. We extend our
earlier work [ Ioannides and Zabel (2000) ], where we estimate a model of housing demand with
neighborhood interactions, to allow for neighborhood choice. We estimate this new model by
utilizing a unique household-level data set that has been augmented with contextual information
at two diﬀerent levels (“scales”) of aggregation. One is at the neighborhood cluster level, of about
ten neighbors, with data from a special sample of the American Housing Survey (AHS). A second
1level is the census tract, to which the dwelling units in the above sample actually belong. Tract-level
data are available in the Summary Tape Files (STF3) of the decennial Census data. We merge
these two data sets by gaining access to conﬁdential data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Our utilization of micro data allows us to implement recent methodological advances in the
econometrics of interactions-based models [ Brock and Durlauf (2001) ]. Our approach sets out to
complement several other studies, notably the recent papers by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple,
Romer, and Sieg (2001), who use community-level data for the Boston MSA in 1980. Nesheim (2001)
uses micro data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 and treats the choice
of neighborhood as a continuous decision identiﬁed by the mean education in one’s neighborhood.
Ioannides and Zabel (2000) ﬁnd strong evidence of both endogenous neighborhood eﬀects, that
is of individuals’ caring about the decisions of their neighbors, and of exogenous neighborhood
eﬀects, that is of individuals’ caring about the socioeconomic characteristics of their neighbors. We
study housing demand by treating members of small neighborhoods, to be referred as neighborhood
clusters, as groups of interacting agents. Under the Nash equilibrium assumption, each individual
takes neighbors’ decisions as given. Individuals who have chosen to reside in the same neighbor-
hood cluster are likely to have correlated observable and unobservable characteristics. Unless one
understands how individuals choose where to locate, little can be known about the distribution
of unobservable factors across neighborhoods. Some of these factors may be important in human
capital formation and responsible for the creation and maintenance of social capital. Such factors
imply dependence among neighbors’ housing consumption decisions and among their unobservable
individual characteristics.
In the present paper we extend our earlier work to account for neighborhood choice and housing
demand as joint decisions in the presence of neighborhood eﬀects. We model the choice of neigh-
borhood by identifying it with the choice of community as represented by a census tract. Census
tracts constitute geographical areas of about 5000 inhabitants that are deﬁned so as to be relatively
homogeneous in regard to the characteristics of their population. Our modelling decision is inﬂu-
enced by a whole host of factors, including the fact that information about neighborhood clusters
is not generally available outside the particular sample of the AHS that we utilize, while descriptive
information is widely available about census tracts from the U.S. Census. Conditional on location
2in a census tract, individuals choose how much housing to consume. In doing so they recognize
that they would be in close proximity to a small number of other households, whose characteristics
and decisions may aﬀect their own choices. It is in this sense that small groups of nearest neighbors
are treated as groups of interacting agents.
We start by describing the data in Section 2 of the paper. In Section 4 we discuss additional
aspects of the data, including the construction of the house price index and the estimation of
permanent income for households, both of which are required by the estimation of the housing
demand model. We develop our model of neighborhood choice and housing demand in Section 3.
We also address there some important methodological issues that arise because of the limitations of
our data set. In particular, since we do not observe samples of clusters in each census tract, except
for those that we use to estimate the demand model, we cannot estimate the choice of neighborhood
cluster conditional on tract choice. This means we cannot estimate directly an important component
of the neighborhood choice model, that is the inclusive value in the second stage of the census tract
choice model. Therefore, we utilize information in the data on the distributions of variables within
tracts to develop proxies for the inclusive value that derive naturally from the behavioral model
that are consistent with the methodological framework in McFadden (1978). Also, we only observe
where individuals actually reside and not alternative tract choices. We rely on a result by McFadden
(1978) that shows that consistent estimates can be obtained, when alternative tract choices are not
observed, by randomly choosing from the full set of census tracts in the metropolitan area where a
household resides. We also lay out the econometric methodology that allows us to obtain consistent
estimates of the housing demand equation conditional on tract choice. This results in the inclusion of
eleven (one for each tract in the choice set) sample selection correction terms in the housing demand
equation. We implement a new result in Brock and Durlauf (2001) that provides valid instruments
for identifying the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect. In sum, our estimates of neighborhood eﬀects
utilize information on households’ choices of neighborhoods and of the quantity of housing and
rests on methodology that is ﬁrmly grounded in the modern theories of interactive discrete choice
and of interdependent preferences.
We present the estimation results in Section 4. Our results for the neighborhood choice model
show that individuals prefer to live near others like themselves. This can perpetuate income inequal-
3ity since those with the best opportunities at economic success will cluster together. The results
for the housing demand equation are similar to those in our earlier paper [ Ioannides and Zabel
(2000) ], where we ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant endogenous and contextual neighborhood eﬀects.
2 The AHS Data
We start with a discussion of the data because its special features motivate our theoretical approach
and our estimation procedure. The main data source used for this study is the national version
of the American Housing Survey (NAHS). The NAHS is an unbalanced panel of more than 50,000
housing units that are interviewed every two years. It serves as the basis for most U.S. housing
statistics. The NAHS contains detailed information on dwelling units and their occupants through
time. This information includes the current owner’s evaluation of the unit’s market value, structural
characteristics of dwelling units, and self-reported information on the house’s current occupants.
In 1985, 630 dwelling units, which will be referred to as kernels, were selected at random,
and up to ten nearest housing units, to be referred to together with the kernel as neighborhood
clusters, were interviewed. Additional observations from larger clusters were added, making the
total number of clusters equal to 680, yielding a data set of 7,350 housing units. This procedure
was repeated in 1989, when 769 kernel units were selected, and in 1993, when 1018 kernel units
were selected. Additional units in existing clusters were included in 1989 to reﬂect additional units
that had been added within the perimeter of the 1985 “neighborhood.” By 1993, a maximum of
20 neighboring units were allowed per cluster. 2 The result is an unbalanced three-wave panel of
dwelling units. Tables 1–5 in Ioannides and Zabel (2000) provide extensive details on the structure
of the data, including observation counts on new clusters, new households and new units, etc., and
their geographic distribution.3
By working with this special subsample of the NAHS, we generate a data set that includes
information on the value and characteristics for all dwelling units in the cluster. The owner-
2We are grateful to Barbara T. Williams, U.S. Bureau of the Census, for this clariﬁcation.
3How good is this deﬁnition of a neighborhood in the form of clusters of dwelling units, as employed by the AHS?
It is obviously appropriate for apartment buildings in densely developed US neighborhoods. Support for suburban
communities comes from Gans (1967), a classic study of suburban social structure:
Neighboring rarely extended more than three or four houses away in each direction, so that the functional neigh-
borhood usually consisted of about ten to twelve houses at the most, although people did say hello to everyone on
the block . Gans, op. cit., p. 156, as quoted by de Souza Briggs (1997), p. 211 ].
4occupant’s characteristics that we work with include, in particular, the owner’s years of schooling,
whether the owner is white, whether the owner is married, the number of persons in the household,
household income, and whether the house has changed hands in the last ﬁve years. For each survey,
owners are asked to estimate how much their property (and, in addition, its lot, if appropriate)
would sell for if it were for sale. Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1999) ﬁnd that
while, on average, owners over-estimate their value by 5%, this bias is not systematically related
to the observed characteristics of the owner, house, or neighborhood.
Since there typically are few clusters in a given MSA, we need to base our model of neighborhood
selection on the choice of census tracts. Access to the conﬁdential version of the NAHS provides
information that allows us to identify the census tract in which each dwelling unit in the public
version of the AHS is located. Census tract characteristics are available in the Summary Tape Files
(STF3) for the decennial Censuses. They include demographic information such as the median
household income, structural characteristics such as the median number of bedrooms, mobility
information such as the percent of households that moved in the last ﬁve years, and tenure and
vacancy statistics. There is also information of the distribution of a number of these variables. This
is crucial for our estimation procedure, as we discuss further below. We merge the information from
the 1980 and 1990 STF3s with the AHS data by census tract. We interpolate and extrapolate from
the reported averages of the 1980 and 1990 STF3 data to create the tract variables for the 1985,
1989, and 1993 surveys.
An observation on a dwelling unit from the AHS in 1985, 1989, and 1993 is included in our
sample only if it: is associated with a regular occupied interview, is owner occupied, lies in a
metropolitan statistical area (MSA), is valued by the owner at least $10,000, and is not missing
any information on unit, occupant, or census tract characteristics that are included in our analysis.
Since we are using the information about the neighbors to measure neighborhood eﬀects, we require
that there be at least four other dwelling units in the cluster after the above selection criteria have
been employed. This reduces the number of observations for 1985, 1989, and 1993 to, respectively,
1747, 1954, and 2671. The 764 neighborhood clusters included in our analysis are the result of
pooling over the three waves of the data. There are, on average, 8.3 observations per cluster,
located in about 100 MSAs. The full frequency distribution of cluster sizes is given in Table 2.
5Additional information on the distribution of clusters across the three years is given in Tables 1–5,
Ioannides and Zabel (2000). The names and summary statistics for the key variables used in the
present study are given in Table 1, for the AHS data, and in Table 3, for the census tract data.
Table 3 compares descriptive statistics of the key variables for the census tracts where households
are observed to reside with those for the ten randomly chosen tracts.
3 Choice of Neighborhood and Housing as Joint Decisions
Choice of neighborhood is an important decision that reﬂects many considerations, of which housing
is a key element. Some neighborhood amenities are truly exogenous factors. Others, however, such
as the ambience of a neighborhood, not only are endogenous but are hard to measure or may be
truly unobservable. They may, in part, reﬂect who chooses to reside in a particular neighborhood
and therefore will be correlated with the socioeconomic characteristics of neighbors. Since neigh-
borhood choice is not random, it is important to know what are the key determinants of individuals’
neighborhood selection. In addition, since locational quality as evaluated by households is likely
to reﬂect their observed and unobserved characteristics, accounting for neighborhood selection is
important in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters in the housing demand equa-
tion, especially when it includes neighborhood eﬀects as regressors. The present paper thus models
neighborhood choice and housing demand as joint decisions, where neighborhood choice is discrete
and housing demand is continuous. This is in contrast to Nesheim (2001), who uses a continuous
notion of neighborhood, and to Ioannides and Zabel (2000), who take neighborhood choice as given
and estimate a model of housing demand with neighborhood eﬀects.
Our approach is designed to utilize available public data that have been augmented with conﬁ-
dential U.S. Census data. The public NAHS data contains information on dwelling units and their
inhabitants and also allows us to identify those that belong to small groups of about ten nearest
neighbors, the members of neighborhood clusters in the terminology of this paper. We identify
the discrete choice of neighborhood via the choice of census tract within a particular metropolitan
area, both of which are observable in our augmented data.
63.1 The Preference Structure
We assume that a household h that is considering occupying a dwelling unit that belongs to neigh-
borhood cluster k; k = 1;:::;Ns; in tract s; s = 1;:::;S; would enjoy utility Ωskh; that is made
up of two additive components:
Ωskh = Vskh + ²skh: (1)
The ﬁrst component, Vskh; is a conditional indirect utility function, that is speciﬁed below as
a function of price and income, and of additional observable and unobservable characteristics of
individuals residing in neighborhood cluster k and of the census tract s in which k lies. The second,
²skh; is a random component of utility, drawn from a distribution that is speciﬁed below, that aﬀects
neighborhood choice and is assumed to be observable by the individual and unobservable by the
econometrician. This model adopts some of the features of Dubin and McFadden (1984).
We specify the conditional indirect utility function in (1) above as














e¡±ps + [Àk + ´h]e¡±ps:
In this deﬁnition of Vskh;4 ³h;®;¹;±;»;¯; and ° are preference parameters. Component !skh is it-
4We may rationalize the emergence of such preferences as those represented in Equ. (3) as follows. Individual h
cares about the quantity of housing services indirectly produced by characteristics of her property i in tract s, qi;
and by attributes of the neighborhood where it is located, xs: Let direct utility depend on composite nonhousing
consumption, ch; and on the consumption of housing services, which are indirectly produced by (qixs); and on own
demographic characteristics that might aﬀect preferences, zh; and on the vectors of housing consumptions in the
neighborhood, yn(h) [ Pollak (1976) ], and of (observable) demographic characteristics of neighbors, zn(h);
Uh = U(ch;qi;xs;zh;yn(h);zn(h)):
Assuming a static setting an individual chooses how to allocate her income Ih to nonhousing consumption, ch; and
housing consumption indirectly through choice of (qi;gs); subject to
ch + P(qi;xs;yn(h);zn(h)) = Ih;
where nonhousing consumption is the numeraire, P(qi;xs;yn(h);zn(h)) denotes the hedonic price function as a function
of the corresponding vector of characteristics, (qi;xs): Neighbors’ consumption and socioeconomic characteristics,
(yn(h);zn(h)); are taken as given (that is, given neighborhood choice) and only (qi;xs) are subject to individual
choice.
Given patterns of development in U.S. cities, one must account for the fact that (qi;xs) are not chosen independently
of (yn(h);zn(h)): In other words, certain combinations of structural characteristics and neighborhood attributes may
typically be found in neighborhoods inhabited by households with certain socioeconomic characteristics. Nonetheless,
from the viewpoint of an individual consumer it is appropriate to think of a choice set deﬁned in terms of bundles
of goods that are freely varied by individual choice, such as interior structural characteristics of dwelling units, and
neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics and decisions, which are treated as quasi-ﬁxed by individuals.
Such a “mixed” indirect utility function is akin to those used in public economics to express externalities and in
consumption theory to express quasi-ﬁxed components of the consumption bundle.
7self deﬁned as the maximum value of a direct utility function, subject to a budget constraint, with
respect to housing and nonhousing consumption. The conditional utility function is thus speciﬁed
as a separable function of tract-speciﬁc characteristics that are independent of the characteristics
of housing choice, gs; and of price, ps; individual income, Ih; and a vector of own demographic char-
acteristics that aﬀect preferences, zh: The conditional utility function is also aﬀected by neighbors’
decisions and characteristics, neighborhood eﬀects, on preferences by being speciﬁed as conditional
on general functions, Πy(¢) and Πz(¢); of the vectors of one’s neighbors’ housing consumption, yn(h);
and of neighbors’ socioeconomic characteristics, zn(h). We deﬁne housing consumption to be the
continuous ﬂow of services that comes from the dwelling structure and the neighborhood amenities
associated with the dwelling’s location.
The terms Àk and ´h on the right hand side of (2) are random variables that are assumed to be
unobservable by the analyst but observable by individuals. The former is a speciﬁc characteristic
of neighborhood cluster k; that is considered as independent and identically distributed across
neighborhood clusters within each census tract but assumed to be observed by all those households
that evaluate cluster k and is thus common among them; the latter is an individual household
characteristic that is independently and identically distributed over all individuals. As we discuss
further below, Àk will stand for a cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀect and ´h an i.i.d. stochastic shock
that make up the error component of the housing demand equation.
Note that the tract-speciﬁc term ³hgs is speciﬁed as individual-speciﬁc. That is, we allow
preferences for tract characteristics to vary across individuals. This allows, for example, a household
with children to put a diﬀerent weight on school quality than a household with no children, or a
household of a given ethnic background or race to value the presence of neighbors of the same
ethnic background or race diﬀerently that those from diﬀerent ethnic backgrounds or races.
Using Roy’s identity, y = ¡@Ω
@p=@Ω
@I ; with the utility function (1) yields the housing demand
function for household h conditional on census tract s and neighborhood cluster k:








+ Àk + ´h: (3)
Notice that diﬀerentiation of Ωskh with respect to ps and Ih; as required by Roy’s identity, eliminates
the terms ³hgs and ²skh; that is, the tract-speciﬁc observable and unobservable components of utility.
Those components will play a role in the neighborhood choice stage of the problem. Below, we
8specify the stochastic structure in further detail.




on the RHS of
(3) expresses an endogenous social eﬀect: a person’s behavior depends on the actual behavior of





expresses a contextual eﬀect, an exogenous social eﬀect which reﬂects taste over
the characteristics of one’s neighbors such as their race, ethnicity, and income.5 The unobserved
stochastic components on the RHS of (3) may reﬂect a conditional version of what Manski calls a
correlated eﬀect: similar individuals are likely to make similar choices of dwelling units, of structural
characteristics, and of neighborhoods and therefore have unobserved characteristics in common.
Such dependence follows as an outcome of the sorting features of the matching process of households
with dwelling units, whereby individuals’ interest in the socioeconomic proﬁle of their neighborhoods
is mediated through the residential matching process. So, correlated eﬀects may express unobserved
characteristics of the neighborhood, as well.
Imposing neighborhood Nash equilibrium within the neighborhood cluster requires considering
a simultaneous equations system along the lines of (3), with an equation for each of the members of
neighborhood cluster k: The simultaneity is evident by the presence of yn(h); the vector consisting
of housing demands by an individual’s neighbors, all of which are endogenous variables, on the
RHS of (3).
In the context of housing demand, the endogenous eﬀect expresses a notion of ”keeping up
with the Joneses,” whereby individuals view their neighbors’ decisions about maintenance, repair,
renovation, and additions and will strive to keep up by making similar decisions and in accordance
with their own preferences. The contextual eﬀect arises as a matter of taste or when owners view
their neighbors’ characteristics, e.g. income, as a signal of their future housing consumption and
thus alter their own housing consumption accordingly.
3.2 Neighborhood Choice
Speciﬁcation of the stochastic structure of ²skh in Equ. (1) allows us to model the choice of
neighborhood as a discrete choice [McFadden (1978)]. The probability that individual h chooses




might not be assumed as a direct contextual eﬀect, it would show up
in a reduced-form, as a result of the presence of the endogenous social eﬀect in the structural form.
9tract sh; from among s = 1;:::;S; and neighborhood cluster kh; from among k = 1;:::;Ns; is
given by the probability that actual utility from this choice exceeds utility from all other choices:
Probshkhh = Prob
n
!shkhh ¡ !skh ¸ ¡(²shkhh ¡ ²skh) ¡ (Àkh ¡ Àk)e¡±ps; 8(s;k) 6= (sh;kh)
o
: (4)
We note that, according to (3), the term e¡±ps is common across all census tracts an individual
considers because the price ps is MSA-speciﬁc. Therefore, the term ´he¡±ps cancels out for all com-
parisons of alternative clusters because they all belong to the same MSA. The term (Àkh ¡Àk)e¡±ps;
however, does not cancel out. Therefore, neighborhood choice is determined by and introduces
dependence among observations for individuals who choose to locate in the same neighborhood
cluster. This not accounted for directly in the neighborhood choice model. The interdependence
of neighbors’ demands, however, does receive a lot of attention below.
Under the assumption that the ²skh’s are independently and identically extreme-value dis-
tributed across all census tracts and all neighborhood clusters within them, the choice probabilities








A problem with applying the MNL model is that ²skh is unlikely to be independent across alternative
residential choices. In particular, alternative cluster choices within the same census tract will include
common tract-level unobservables that will cause their error terms to be correlated.
Deﬁne the set Cs; s = 1;:::;S to be the set of clusters in census tract s and let Ns = jCsj:
One can think of a hierarchical structure where the Cs’s constitute one level and the census tracts
another. At the lower level, that is conditional on a tract, characteristics of clusters within a tract
that are reﬂected in the ²skh’s are assumed to be correlated. At the higher level, characteristics of
clusters across census tracts are assumed to be uncorrelated. Also, conditional on the choice of a
census tract, the cluster choices are assumed to be independent.6 Such a structure is the basis for
the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model.
Under the assumption of a NMNL structure for the ²skh’s, the dependence of choices over a
set of k = 1;:::;Ns alternative clusters within tract s may be described in terms of a parameter
6See Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) for a similar approach to decomposing the universe of choices into smaller
choice sets.
10&; & 2 [0;1]; which denotes the degree of similarity as reﬂected in the unobserved component of
the evaluation of alternative clusters within each tract. If & = 0; then the model implies that
alternatives within each tract are independent and the multinomial logit model applies within each
tract as well. In that case, the choice probabilities are given by (5). If & ! 1; the other extreme
holds and alternatives within a tract are perceived as identical. The model then implies that the
choice is made in terms of the maximum value of the utility function.7
The ﬁrst stage of the standard estimation strategy for the NMNL model is to estimate the
cluster choice model conditional on census tract choice using MNL. Let Ts denote the tract-speciﬁc


























(1 ¡ &)`nNj + ³hgj + (1 ¡ &)Tj
¤: (7)
As part of this ﬁrst stage one estimates the inclusive value based on the results of the cluster
choice model and substitutes this into the tract choice equation (7). The second stage involves the
estimation of the tract choice equation using MNL. A particular problem is that, due to the nature
of the NAHS data, we do not observe multiple clusters in a given census tract. Thus we need to
devise an alternative estimation procedure for the inclusive value. In doing so, we take a lead from
McFadden (1978), p.91–95, regarding aggregation and the treatment of similarities.
The critical step in our procedure relies on the observation that, by the law of large numbers,
when the number of neighborhood clusters Ns ! 1; the RHS of (6) may be written in terms of
the joint moment generating function of the multivariate distribution of cluster-speciﬁc variables
7This is a special case of the generalized extreme value distribution [ McFadden (1978; 1981; 1984) ]. The NMNL
















This leads, in turn, to a concise description of the overall indirect utility function, as the optimum value of utility
associated with the discrete decision problem [ McFadden (1978), Theorem 1, Corollary, p. 538 ], which in our case
encompasses the continuous part, as well. We return to this further below.
11(yn(h);zn(h)) within each tract.8 To see this, assume that z is a scalar and (y;z) are joint normal
N(my;mz;¾2
y;¾2
z;#); and the cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀect Àk has distribution N(0;¾2
À): From the
deﬁnition of the moment generating function MGF(B;Γ) = E(y;z)fexp[By + Γz]g it follows that
Ts may be written in terms of the parameters of the utility function, of the tract-speciﬁc price, and































where the auxiliary variables B and Γ are deﬁned as functions of parameters and of the price,
B ´ 1
1¡&¯e¡±ps;Γ ´ 1
1¡&°e¡±ps: An assumption of “spatial uniformity” (which we think is an
appropriate assumption in view of the way tract boundaries are drawn in the U.S.) allows us to
identify the mean of each cluster-speciﬁc mean with the respective tract-speciﬁc mean. Also, we
have information about the distributions of a number of tract-level variables including individual
and dwelling characteristics that we use to approximate ¾2
y and ¾2
z. There is also some limited
information about the joint distribution of some of the tract-level variables that we can use to
approximate #. Alternatively, Ts may be computed non-parametrically from the frequency distri-
butions available in STF3. Both the exact approach using the the moment generating function for a
multivariate normal distribution of contextual variables within each tract and the semi-parametric
approximation using reported frequencies constitute innovative uses of these data. Our approach
subsumes the choice of clusters into the choice over census tracts.
To summarize, our strategy for the neighborhood choice model is to estimate the census tract
choice equation (7), with the inclusive value for each of the tracts in an individual’s opportunity set,
(T1;:::;TSh); being given by (6) (or by (8), as appropriate). We note that this uses the frequency
distributions of the tract-level variables to approximate the inclusive value associated with consid-
ering alternative neighborhood clusters within each tract and therefore subsumes the neighborhood
choice model within tract choice. We may concisely describe the value to the individual from the
8See Quigley (1985), who works with a mean-variance approximation to the inclusive value. Our approach exploits
better the analytical setting of the problem.















where Ts is given from (6) (or by (8), as appropriate) and Ps from (7), respectively. We underscore
that the deﬁnition of the inclusive value above subsumes the random component associated with
the evaluation of each cluster, Àke¡±ps:
Conditional on choice of tract according to (7), the cluster choice equation still holds. It implies,
in particular, that diﬀerent households that choose to locate in the same cluster have also chosen
to locate in the same tract (by deﬁnition). They have done so after having obtained the same
evaluation for the cluster they have chosen, which is represented by Àke¡±ps: Unfortunately, this
eﬀect is not identiﬁable and we proceed to ignore it in the discrete choice part of the problem.
The next problem we confront is how to estimate the tract choice equation given that we have
no information about which neighborhoods (either at the level of clusters or of tracts) households
have considered before they decided to locate where we observe them. As a ﬁrst approach, we
have implemented an overlooked [ but see Quigley (1985) and Blackley and Ondrich (1988), for
two exceptions ] suggestion of McFadden (1978), that the discrete choice model may be estimated
by generating a random sample of alternatives from the full choice set (which may be unobserved).
Consistency holds provided that if an alternative is included in the assigned set, then it has the
logical possibility of being an observed choice from that set [ McFadden, op. cit., 88–89 ].
Our data allow us to generate a random sample of alternative census tracts from among all
those comprising the metropolitan area. For each observation in the cluster subsample of the
public NAHS data, we identify (using conﬁdential U.S. Census data) the tract where it belongs
and choose randomly ten tracts, from among the universe of tracts in the respective metropolitan
area, which we deﬁne as the relevant housing market. Table 3 juxtaposes summary statistics for
the actual census tracts in which our AHS observations lie with those for the ten randomly selected
tracts. Generally, the sample statistics are similar for the two groups. We estimate a discrete choice
model, Equ. (7), where individual h chooses the tract where he resides out of a set of Sh = 11
tracts that have been chosen randomly from the metropolitan area. We use as regressors tract-level
characteristics, on their own and also interacted with individual characteristics. We also include
individual variables interacted with quantiles of the distributions of tract-level variables to proxy
13for the inclusive value.
3.3 Continuous Choice
The discrete and continuous choices modelled here cannot be stochastically speciﬁed as independent
of one another. Both contribute to the estimation of the behavioral parameters (®;¯;°;±;³;»;¹)
and of the stochastic structure ¾;¾2
À;¾2
´: If we were to ignore the choice of the neighborhood in esti-
mating the demand model, unobservable elements of the choice problem will aﬀect the consistency
of the estimates. Correcting for sample selection bias associated with neighborhood choice is, in
and of itself, an important element of the impact of neighborhood eﬀects.
The behavioral model allows for indirect utility, conditional on neighborhood choice, and there-
fore housing demand as well, to reﬂect endogenous and contextual neighborhood eﬀects. In speci-
fying such an indirect utility function, we are careful to allow for dependence that is not eliminated
by diﬀerentiation with respect to price and to income when Roy’s identity is applied to obtain
housing demand. As Dubin and McFadden (1984) note, the additive shock ´h that is assumed to
be present in the demand equation (3) and may be correlated with the unobserved components of
utility, ²skh; must be multiplicatively separable from a function of the housing price in the condi-
tional indirect utility function. This requirement has guided our selection of functional forms and
the parameterization of the stochastic structure.
The mean of ²skh; conditional on alternative sh being chosen according to the MNL model, is
given by:
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where Ps is the probability of choosing tract s; given by (7) and the distribution of ²s is given by
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14The unconditional mean and variance of the stochastic shock in the continuous equation for
housing demand, ´h; are 0 and ¾2
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where Rsh is the correlation coeﬃcient of ´h and ²shkh: Therefore, consideration of dependence
between the random shock determining tract choice and the individual shock aﬀecting housing
demand, (²skh;´h); introduces the correlation coeﬃcients (R1;:::;RSh); between those shocks as
additional unknown parameters to be estimated. The conditional second moments for the entire
family of generalized extreme value distributions exist in closed form and are given in Dubin (1985),
Appendix A. Dubin’s formulas can be applied to the case of the nested logit model.9 The above
formulas are indicative of the way in which sample selection bias correction works for the case of
errors that are extreme-value distributed.
3.4 A Model of Housing Demand, Neighborhood Eﬀects and Neighborhood
Choice
We now incorporate the model of neighborhood selection into our model of housing demand with
neighborhood eﬀects. We correct for sample selection bias in the standard fashion by writing
´h = E[´hjs = sh] + Ãh; where Ãh is white noise. We thus have:
yskh = ® + ¹ps + »zh + ±Ih + ¯yn(h) + °zn(h) + Àk + E[´hjs = sh] + Ãh; (14)
where the explicit form of the sample selection bias correction term is given in equation (13),
and endogenous and contextual eﬀects have been speciﬁed in terms of the mean of neighbors’
housing demand and characteristics, that is, yn(h) and zn(h); respectively. Thus, we ﬁrst estimate
the neighborhood choice equation (7) and use the results to estimate the sample selection bias
9However, Dubin suggests it is better to work directly with the assumption that ´ has a linear conditional
expectation in the space of the “induced” independent extreme value random variables that generate the conditional
branch probabilities [ ibid., p. 253 ]. We note that this is important in the context of a suggestion by Moﬃtt (2001)
that an additional route to identiﬁcation of neighborhood eﬀects may be aﬀorded through the variance-covariance
structure. This clearly deserves further attention in future work.
15correction terms included in (14). This allows us to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters
in the housing demand equation.10
Rapaport (1997) estimates a model of housing demand and community choice, without the
neighborhood eﬀects, and ﬁnds that accounting for community choice makes a big diﬀerence in her
estimates of the parameters in the demand equation.
3.5 Identiﬁcation of Neighborhood Eﬀects in Housing Demand with Self Selec-
tion
As is clear from the housing demand equation, the endogenous social eﬀect yn(h) is correlated with
the error term since it includes the unobserved cluster eﬀect, Àk. Thus we must instrument for yn(h).
As Manski (1993) shows, valid instruments can be diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Our model of neighborhood
choice and housing demand results in a natural set of instruments. As Brock and Durlauf (2001)
show, identiﬁcation of neighborhood eﬀects is enabled by selection bias correction, precisely because
in “order to achieve identiﬁcation, one needs an individual control whose neighborhood average is
not a contextual eﬀect” [ ibid., p. 41 ]. This is exactly what selection bias correction introduces
into the estimation problem. Using the housing demand equations for all members of a cluster
as a system to solve for yn(h), the cluster means of the sample selection terms arise naturally as
identifying instruments:
lnyn(h) = ¼0 + ¼1 lnp· + ¼2zn(h) + ¼3E[´hjs = sh] + ´n(h); (15)
where E[´hjs = sh] denotes the means of the selection correction ( “Heckman” ) terms for individual
h’s neighbors, given by (13), ´n(h) is the unobserved error term, and the neighbors’ mean income
In(h) is included in zn(h) for brevity.
Another source of instruments comes from placing our model in the context of the hedonic
theory of housing markets. In particular, we include the means of the structural characteristics
of neighbors’ dwelling units as instruments. While one might question the validity of the own
structural characteristics as instruments, it should be noted that our instruments are the means
10Our treatment assumes that all social interactions eﬀects are among the group of neighbors who are actually
observed. Naturally, varying cluster layouts might allow for interactions from neighbors who are not included in the
sample. We are ignoring such eﬀects. Alternatively, we may assume that we sample individuals’ behavior in a sort
of spatial steady state.
16of one’s neighbors which do not include one’s own values. We can test for the validity of these
instruments using an over-identiﬁcation test. Ioannides and Zabel (2000) do so and do not reject
the exogeneity of these instruments. Note that this test requires that one assume that at least one
of the instruments is exogenous. This condition is satisﬁed in this paper. That is, the means of
the neighbors’ Heckman terms are exogenous by construction, and therefore, we can test for the
exogeneity of all the neighbors’ structural characteristics.
In contrast to our model of neighborhood choice when objects of choice are census tracts and
contextual eﬀects are appropriately described in terms of the distributions of characteristics within
census tracts, our demand model reﬂects the assumption that each individual knows her neighbors,
and demand is a spatial autoregression with correlated cluster speciﬁc eﬀects. This can be handled,
in principle, but it is not a feature of standard packages. If, on the other hand, we were to assume
that the endogenous eﬀects are through the expected consumption of one’s neighbors (relative to
some information set that needs to be speciﬁed), then the individual cluster-speciﬁc eﬀects are
independent across individuals, and the model is therefore easier to estimate.
The contextual eﬀects included in the part of the indirect utility function (1) that aﬀect housing
demand comprise the socioeconomic characteristics of one’s neighbors. It is possible that other
actions of neighbors, such as those associated with social capital enter housing demand. Such
considerations lead us to recognize that social capital itself may be endogenous and therefore
reﬂects the characteristics of those who decide to locate in diﬀerent neighborhoods. New issues of
identiﬁcation do arise, in which case the treatment of Durlauf (2001) is particularly apt.
4 Estimation
In this section, we estimate the model of neighborhood choice and housing demand, represented
by equations (7) and (14). We ﬁrst discuss two auxiliary estimation tasks that are necessary for
estimating the main model. Subsection 4.1 presents the construction of a house price index that is
appropriate for our model. Subsection 4.2 follows with a description of our estimates of permanent
income. We then turn to the estimation of the model which we carry out in two steps: ﬁrst, we
estimate the neighborhood choice model; second, we use the results of the neighborhood choice
model to correct for selection bias and estimate the housing demand equation.
174.1 A House Price Index
Estimation of housing demand requires knowledge of the price of housing. The deﬁnition of a house
price index must be appropriate to the relevant housing market and to the deﬁnition of the good
and therefore is an important concern of housing research. We have modelled housing demand in
terms of a continuous scalar quantity that represents the ﬂow of housing services from both the
structure and the neighborhood in which the unit is located. The price of housing is thus the price
for a unit of housing services, which is unobserved. We invoke a standard assumption in the housing
literature and assume that the market for housing is the MSA. Thus, there is one price per MSA [
Zabel (2002) ].
Recall that the clusters data in our sample come from 100 diﬀerent MSAs for the years 1985,
1989, and 1993. We were unable to ﬁnd a price index that covered all 100 MSAs for these three
years. To underscore this diﬃculty, consider for example the Case-Shiller index [ Case and Shiller
(1987) ]. It is available for 90 MSAs, but the use of this index results in a loss of about one third
of the data since not all MSAs covered by the Case-Shiller index are among the 100 MSAs in our
data set. Also, the Case-Shiller index would have to be made comparable across MSAs, which
would require a technique like the one we implement below. Therefore, we need to estimate an
MSA-speciﬁc price index.
A number of methods have been used to obtain the price of housing services. One common
approach is to estimate a hedonic house price function, P(qi;xs;yn(h);zn(h)); as a function of the
corresponding vector of structural characteristics of dwelling units, qi; of neighborhood attributes,
xs; and of neighbors’ consumption and socioeconomic characteristics, (yn(h);zn(h)): In a recent
paper, Sieg et al. (2001) classify price indices that are based on hedonic regressions into two types:
one involves statistical composite commodities and computes the price of a “standard” dwelling
unit across markets; the other involves a market-speciﬁc scaling factor relative to the price of an
“average quality” dwelling unit in the market.11 Our approach allows for the value of an average
quality house to be calculated for diﬀerent geographical areas that can be used to generate an index
of relative house prices. That is, we estimate a hedonic house price model, according to Equ. (16)
below, and use the estimated intercept as a house price index.
11Or put diﬀerently, the former holds quantities constant, like the consumer price index, and the latter holds prices
constant like the GDP deﬂator.
18Our house price hedonic function involves expressing the log of the reported values of a dwelling
unit i in census tract s in MSA j at time t; `nWisjt; as a function of qisjt; a vector of structural
characteristics of a unit, and of xst; a vector of neighborhood characteristics that are constant within
each cluster and also over a broader geographic area that can account for factors like school quality
and safety. The public version of non-neighborhood clusters subsample of the NAHS data does not
include any such cluster characteristics. We make up for this by using census tract characteristics
to proxy for all levels of neighborhood quality. This is made possible by our access to conﬁdential
information that allows us to identify the tracts where the individual observations of the NAHS lie.
Our use of the non-cluster data aﬀords two advantages. One is that they make up approximately
90% of the NAHS data thus giving us a much larger data set. Second, the prices thus obtained
come from a diﬀerent data set than the one used to estimate the housing demand equation.
We estimate the following house price hedonic model
`nWisjt = a0 +
J¡1 X
j=1
a0jtMSAijt + a1qisjt + a2gst + uisjt; (16)
i = 1;:::;Nj; s = 1;:::;Sj; j = 1;:::;J; t = 1985; 1989; 1993:
The structural characteristics of a unit include the age of the unit and its square, the number
of full baths, of bedrooms, and of total rooms, whether or not there is a garage and a number
of additional structural quality variables (such as whether the enumerator saw cracks on walls
and ceilings, broken pipes, etc.). The neighborhood characteristics include a dummy variable that
indicates whether or not the unit lies in the central city of the MSA, the property tax rate, and
tract-level variables that include median household income, the percent over 25 years of age who
graduated from high school, and the percent of the tract population who are nonwhite.
There are 140 potential MSAs but we require that there are at least ten observations in an MSA
in a given year for observations in that MSA to be included in the regression. This leaves 8603,
10083, and 8283 observations for each of 1985, 1989, and 1993, respectively. As we clarify below
we estimate the housing demand equation using the pooled data. In order for the price index to be
comparable across years, we estimate the house price hedonic using the pooled data. The adjusted
R2 is 0.654. Given that we deﬁne each MSA in each year as a separate housing market, it would
make sense to allow the coeﬃcients to vary across time and space. This would lead to a very large
19number of parameters in the model and very few degrees of freedom in some of the MSAs. Instead,
we restrict the coeﬃcients on all variables but the intercept to be constant across MSAs. This is
consistent with Mills and Simenauer (1996) who ﬁnd very little variation in coeﬃcients over time
and space when they estimate a house price hedonic using national data from the House Financing
Transaction Database, collected by the National Association of Realtors over the period 1986-1992.
We do allow the coeﬃcients to vary over time (though not across MSAs) but this decreases the
estimated standard error of the regression by only 0.05%. So we use the restricted model for our
analysis.
The actual regression results are not reported here because they have not yet been released for
disclosure purposes. We note that, as a group, the neighborhood proxies are very signiﬁcant. We
use the estimated MSA-speciﬁc intercepts to calculate a price index for the MSA where unit i lies,
ˆ pjt = ˆ a0jt: We set the price for Denver in 1985, the excluded MSA, to be 100 and those for the
other MSAs to be 100 times the antilog of the corresponding coeﬃcient estimate.
4.2 Estimating Permanent Income
It is standard practice to use permanent rather than current income in housing demand equations [
Olsen (1987); Goodman (1988); Henderson and Ioannides (1989) ]. Also, it is reasonable to assume
that individuals are better able to predict their neighbors’ permanent rather than current income
given the larger ﬂuctuations in the latter measure. We deﬁne (the log of) permanent income as the
predicted value from the following model of (the natural log of) current income:
`nIht = µ0 +
J¡1 X
j=1
µ0jtMSAhjt + µ1cht + ºhjt; (17)
where cht includes a cubic polynomial in age and years of education, dummy variables that indicate
if the owner is married, male, Black, or Hispanic and whether or not the unit lies in the central city of
the MSA. We include the same MSA dummy variables that are in the house price hedonic regressions
(16) to capture diﬀerences in the cost-of-living across MSAs. We use the non-neighborhood clusters
subsample of the NAHS to estimate the model of income for the same reasons that led us to use these
data to estimate the price index. We estimate a separate regression for each of the three years. The
adjusted R2’s for these regressions (with the number of observations in parentheses) for 1985, 1989,
and 1993 are 0.405 (17,904), 0.395 (23,610), and 0.329 (19,038), respectively. The actual regression
20results have not yet been released for disclosure purposes. We then use the parameter estimates
from these regressions, along with the data from the cluster subsample to estimate the permanent
income variable that is included in the neighborhood choice and housing demand equations.
4.3 Estimation of Neighborhood Choice
We estimate the model of neighborhood choice according to Equ. (7). We use individual and tract-
level characteristics as explanatory variables. We select a variety of variables in order to capture
possibly complicated eﬀects contributing to the attractiveness of diﬀerent neighborhoods and their
amenities, especially as they pertain to human capital accumulation. We have been inﬂuenced
in the selection of explanatory variables by such previous studies as Borjas (1998), Nechyba and
Strauss (1998), Rapaport (1997), and Quigley (1985). Overman (1999) and Quigley (1985) are the
only other studies in the literature that we are aware of that use two diﬀerent sources of contextual
information that are hierarchically related to one another.
We estimate a number of regression models but report only two. The ﬁrst model is a benchmark
model that contains only tract speciﬁc variables. From column 1 of Table 4, we see that a higher
percentage of ownership in the tract, of residents commuting less than twenty minutes, and of
nonwhites in the tract, and a higher median age of dwellings increase the likelihood of choosing a
tract. On the other hand, a higher poverty rate, unemployment rate, vacancy rate, median income,
median rent, and median age of tract residents decrease the likelihood of choosing a tract. This
regression has a pseudo R2 of 0.0734.
While these results are interesting in their own right, it is clear that preferences for such tract
characteristics as those discussed above will vary across demographic groups. Thus, to control
for demographic characteristics, we interact the tract-level variables with individual-level variables.
These results appear in column 2 of Table 4. First, we create three dummy variables that indicate if
the individual is in the ﬁrst quartile, the middle two quartiles, and the fourth quartile of the tract-
speciﬁc distribution of income as reported in the STF3 data. We interact these dummy variables
with median income, median rent, the vacancy rate, and the homeownership rate. We ﬁnd that
the valuation of median tract income is increasing in individual income. This will actually increase
the likelihood of tract choice for those in the upper income quartile. We ﬁnd that the valuation
21of vacancy rates declines with income though it increases in an absolute sense. On the other hand
while individuals positively value homeownership rates, this valuation declines with income.
We interact the tract-level race variables with the dummy variables that indicate whether the
individual is white or nonwhite. For whites, an increase in the percent nonwhite will decrease
the likelihood of tract choice but there is no additional eﬀect if there is at least 50% nonwhites in
the tract. For nonwhites, an increase in the percent nonwhite will increase the likelihood of tract
choice and there is an additional positive eﬀect if there is at least 50% nonwhites in the tract.
We generate three dummy variables that indicate if the individual has a college degree, at most
a high school degree, and no high school degree and interact them with the percent graduated from
high school in the tract (25 years of age and older). Those with no high school degree (college
degree) are less (more) likely to choose a tract if the percentage of high school graduates increases.
We generate three dummy variables that indicate if the individual is in the ﬁrst quartile, the
middle two quartiles and the fourth quartile of the sample distribution of age. We interact these
variables with the median age in the census tract. We ﬁnd that the impact of an increase in the
median age increase with age such that those in the ﬁrst three quartiles will be less likely to choose
the tract while the oldest individuals will be more likely to choose the tract.
We generate three dummy variables that indicate if the individual is in the ﬁrst quartile, the
middle two quartiles and the fourth quartile of the sample distribution of number of persons in
the household. We interact these variables with the median number of bedrooms in the census
tract. We ﬁnd that the impact of an increase in the median number of bedrooms will decrease
the likelihood that the smallest sized households will choose the tract while there is no signiﬁcant
impact for larger sized households.
These results strongly suggest that individuals like to live with others like themselves. This
can perpetuate income inequality since those with the best opportunities at economic success will
cluster together.
Next we add tract-level variables interacted with price, which is MSA-speciﬁc, and these vari-
ables are signiﬁcant as a group. The addition of these variables is motivated by the structure of
the neighborhood choice model.
Finally we include variables that characterize the distributions of the tract-level characteristics.
22These terms capture the variation in clusters in each tract and proxy for the inclusive value in
the tract choice model. We include tract-level variables that give the 25th and 75th percentile of
income, rent and age. We also include variables that indicate the percentage of residents with 8
or less years of education, 9–11 years, 12 years, 13–15 years, and 16 or more years of education.
We include a set of variables that give the percent of housing units that are less than two years of
age, between 2–5, 5–10, 10–20, 20–30, 30–40, and more than forty years of age. We also include
variables that indicate the percentage of units with 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 or more bedrooms. These
variables (interacted with individual-level variables) are signiﬁcant as a whole and each group of
variables is signiﬁcant as well. This is the model we use to obtain the predicted probabilities
that are necessary to compute the sample selection bias correction terms used in the continuous
estimation model below. We are aware of the fact that the selection correction terms that we
compute are obtained from a discrete choice model with extreme value disturbances but are used
with a continuous choice model that is predicated on normal disturbances. However, the import
of the Brock–Durlauf theory [ Brock and Durlauf (2001) ] is that it is crucial to have appropriate
instruments, in order to be able to estimate the neighborhood eﬀects model, even if they may be
semi-parametric or even non-parametric.12 It is thus behooves us to include complicated interacted
variables that allows us to mimic the dependence implied by the deﬁnition of the inclusive value
above. When a full complement of 87 explanatory variables are included, the pseudo R2 rises
to 0.1889, and the additional variables included over those in the estimation model reported are
statistically signiﬁcant with respect to the likelihood ratio test.
4.4 Estimation of Housing Demand with Neighborhood Eﬀects
The estimation of housing demand along the lines of Equ. (14) is fairly straightforward except
for the presence of endogenous neighborhood eﬀects. As discussed in Section 3, we correct for
(non-random) neighborhood choice by including an estimate of the expectation of the disturbance
term conditional on census tract choice. This results in an additional eleven selection (Heckman)
correction terms, one for each of the tract choices in the neighborhood choice model. The addition
of these terms in the housing demand equation induces heteroscedasticity. Therefore, we report
12We thank Steven Durlauf for this point.
23heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the log of housing demand.
The regressors include the log of house price, the log of permanent income, the number of persons
in the household, and dummy variables that indicate if the owner has graduated from high school,
is married, is white, and moved in the last ﬁve years. The parameter estimates for these dummy
variables are suppressed for reasons of conﬁdentiality. Generally, the results for these variables are
comparable to the ones in Ioannides and Zabel (2000).
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the housing demand equation. The ﬁrst set of results
pertains to an OLS regression with one observation for each cluster and no neighborhood eﬀects.
Therefore, it can serve as a benchmark representing conventional studies of housing demand with
our data. The eleven Heckman selection correction terms are statistically signiﬁcant as a group at
the 1% level. Their inclusion raises the adjusted R2 from 0.1780 to 0.2101, and most of them are
signiﬁcant on their own, too. There is a noteworthy diﬀerence in the estimated parameters from the
case with no selection correction. The estimated price elasticity is absolutely smaller in the model
with selection correction than in the case without, ¡0:175 versus ¡0:2222. The ﬁve demographic
variables (other than income) continue to be signiﬁcant as a group when the Heckman terms are
included in the model.
Next, we estimate the housing demand equation with neighborhood eﬀects using random eﬀects,
where we include the actual mean of neighbors’ housing demand among neighbors as a regressor.
The associated endogenous social eﬀect is very high, 0..8878, and very signiﬁcant. We test for the
endogeneity of the mean of neighbors’ housing demand using a Hausman test and reject the null
hypothesis that it is exogenous (p-value < 0.0001).
To correct for the endogeneity bias, we ﬁrst estimate the reduced form equation for the mean
of neighbors’ housing demand, according to Equ. (15), using in addition to the variables in the
RHS of (15) the means of the structural characteristics of neighboring units. One of the important
contributions of this paper over Ioannides and Zabel (2000) is the ability to identify the model
using the neighborhood means of the Heckman terms. As shown by Brock and Durlauf (2001),
these are valid instruments. These terms are very signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage regression. In our
previous paper, we had to assume the exogeneity of one of the neighborhood mean structural terms
that we used to identify our model. Here, the presence of the Heckman terms allows us to test
24for the exogeneity of all the neighborhood mean structural terms using the over-identiﬁcation test.
The result is that the exogeneity of these variables is not rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
This provides validation for the use of the neighborhood means of the structural characteristics to
identify the housing demand model with interactions in Ioannides and Zabel (2000).
We use the results from the ﬁrst stage regression to consistently estimate the model of housing
demand. These results are given in column 3, Table 5. The estimated price and income elasticities,
¡:3019 and :1207; respectively, are statistically very signiﬁcant. While the price elasticity appears
to be reasonable, that of income is surprisingly low. However, all studies that have used this
particular data set consistently report low estimates for income elasticities [ c.f Goodman (1988)
]. The parameter estimates for the own socioeconomic characteristics cannot be reported here, for
reasons of conﬁdentiality, but they are not statistically signiﬁcant as a group. The endogenous
neighborhood eﬀect, 0.6244, is large and highly signiﬁcant. The contextual eﬀects associated with
the neighborhood cluster are not individually signiﬁcant, except for income, which is .2600 and
very signiﬁcant, but are signiﬁcant as a group.13 In contrast to our earlier results in Ioannides
and Zabel (2000), here we include as regressors the Heckman selection correction terms but they
are not signiﬁcant as a group. When the means of the structural characteristics of neighboring
units are not used as instruments, the estimate (from regressions that we did carry out but do not
report here) of the endogenous neighborhood eﬀect, 0.8175, is again very high. Also, just as in
Ioannides and Zabel (2000), the correction of the standard errors because of the use of predicted
values appears to be negligible.
The selection correction terms are signiﬁcant in the regressions without neighborhood eﬀects but
not in those where such eﬀects are included. Clearly, these terms pick up some of the unobserved
components due to neighborhood choice that are part of the unobservables in the model without
neighborhood eﬀects. This suggests that the neighborhood eﬀects we introduce in the model capture
the unobserved individual factors that aﬀect neighborhood choice.
To further probe the possible model uncertainty that may be aﬀecting our estimates, we have
also estimated the demand equation by using the structural characteristics of just one neighboring
13An alternative way to interpret the contextual eﬀects is through the impact of the average value of the independent
variable. E.g., the total elasticity of income is equal to average of the own eﬀect and of the neighbors’ eﬀect,
appropriately weighted. This consideration does raise the estimated income elasticity.
25unit as the additional set of instruments instead of the means of all neighboring units. These are
the fourth set of results reported on Table 5. We see now that the endogenous social eﬀect is .2101,
still very signiﬁcant but much smaller, and the contextual eﬀect associated with mean neighbors’
income is .6088 and thus much larger, than the respective ones when the means of all neighboring
units’s structural characteristics are used as instruments.
The regressions we report in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 include random cluster-speciﬁc eﬀects,
which explain a large part of the total variance of the regression. Endogenous eﬀects are smaller
when we allow for cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects relative to when we do not. Therefore, the fact
that diﬀerent individuals are in the same neighborhood is an important part of the story, that is,
even after we have corrected for neighborhood choice.
5 Concluding Remarks
Neighborhood choice has never before been examined at this level of detail. Here it does double
duty: it is interesting in its own right and serves to correct for selection, when individuals are seen
choosing their neighborhood eﬀects via their choice of a dwelling to own and occupy. Generally,
socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods appear to be important determinants of neighbor-
hood choice. In particular, we ﬁnd that individuals prefer to live with others like themselves. This
result seems to be consistent with the observed sorting of individuals in the U.S. by income, race,
and education.
Our estimates of the housing demand equation are quite similar to those of Ioannides and Zabel
(2000) and do conﬁrm that neighborhood eﬀects are important. Neighborhood choice appears to
be associated with the following diﬀerences, when it is accounted for relative to when it is not, as
in our earlier results. First, there is a smaller endogenous social eﬀect: the elasticity of housing
demand with respect to mean neighbors’ demand is 0.6244 instead of 0.660 in the earlier paper.
Second, there is a larger contextual eﬀect: the elasticity of housing demand with respect to mean
neighbors’ income is 0.2600 instead of 0.175 in the earlier paper.
All these parameters are estimated with great precision. Recall that our procedure for account-
ing for individuals’ opportunity sets assumes that individuals choose the census tract in which we
observe them over ten census tracts that we select randomly from within the same metropolitan
26area. This arguably biases results in favor of making neighborhood choice more signiﬁcant. The
fact that we ﬁnd few diﬀerences with the estimates obtained when neighborhood choice is ignored
is, therefore, quite interesting.
Overall, this research heeds the call by Schelling (1978) on the importance of micro neighborhood
interactions and by Glaeser (2000) and others on the need to assess the quantitative signiﬁcance
of urban interactions. Alternative ways for making up for the unobservability of individuals’ op-
portunity sets, such as limiting the full set to tracts with similar characteristics, deserve attention
in future research. Our framework may also be generalized to include models of income and labor
supply behavior with neighborhood eﬀects.
276 References
Blackley, Paul and Jan Ondrich (1988), “A Limiting Joint-Choice Model for Discrete and Contin-
uous Housing Characteristics,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70, 266–274.
Borjas, George J. (1998), “To Ghetto or Not to Ghetto: Ethnicity and Residential Segregation,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 44, 228–253.
Brock, William A., and Steven N. Durlauf (2001) “Interactions-Based Models,” 3297–3380, in
Heckman, James J., and Edward Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 5, North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Dubin, Jeﬀrey F. (1985), “Conditional Moments in the Generalized Extreme Value Family,” Ap-
pendix B, 217–254, in Consumer Durables Choice and the Demand for Electricity, North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Dubin, Jeﬀrey F., and Daniel McFadden (1984), “ An Econometric Analysis of Residential Elec-
trical Appliance Holdings and Consumption,” Econometrica, 52, 345–362.
de Souza Briggs, Xavier (1997), “Moving Up versus Moving Out: Neighborhood Eﬀects in Housing
Mobility Programs,” Housing Policy Debate, 8, 195–233.
Durlauf, Steven N. (2001), “On The Empirics of Social Capital,” University of Wisconsin, mimeo.
Epple, Dennis, and Holger Sieg (1999), “Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions,”
Journal of Political Economy, 107, 4, 645–681.
Epple, Dennis, Thomas Romer, and Holger Sieg (2001), “Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority
Rule: An Empirical Analysis,” Econometrica, 69, 6, 1437–1465.
Gans, Herbert (1967), The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban Commu-
nity, Columbia University Press, New York.
Goodman, A.C., (1988), ”An Econometric Model of Housing Price, Permanent Income, Tenure
Choice, and Housing Demand,” Journal of Urban Economics, 23, 237-353.
Glaeser, Edward L. (2000), “The Future of Urban Research: Non-Market Interactions,” Brookings-
Wharton Papers on Urban Aﬀairs , 101–138.
Henderson, J. Vernon, and Yannis M. Ioannides (1989), “Dynamic Aspects of Consumer Decisions
in Housing Markets,” Journal of Urban Economics, 26, 212–230.
Ioannides, Yannis M. (2002) “Residential Neighborhood Eﬀects,” Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 32, 2, 145–165. [PDF at http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/index.html].
Ioannides, Yannis M., and Jeﬀrey E. Zabel (2000), “Neighborhood Eﬀects and Housing De-
mand,” presented at the Conference on Empirics of Social Interactions,” Brookings In-
stitution, January 14–15, 2000; Journal of Applied Econometrics, forthcoming. [PDF at
http://ase.tufts.edu/econ/papers/index.html].
Katz, Laurence, Jeﬀrey K. Kling and Jeﬀrey. Liebman (2001), “Moving to Opportunity in Boston:
Early Impacts of a Housing Mobility Program,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 2, 607–
654.
28Kiel, Katherine A., and Jeﬀrey E. Zabel (1997) “Evaluating the Usefulness of the American Hous-
ing Survey for Creating House Price Indices,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
14, 189-202.
McFadden, Daniel (1978), “Modelling the Choice of Residential Location,” in Karlqvist, Anders,
et al., eds., Spatial Interaction Theory and Planning Models, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
75–96.
McFadden, Daniel (1981), “Econometric Models of Probabilistic Choice,” in Manski, Charles
F., and Daniel McFadden (1981), Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric
Applications, MIT Press, 198–272.
McFadden, Daniel (1984), “Econometric Analysis of Qualitative Response Models,” Ch. 24, 1395–
1457, in Griliches, Zvi, and Michael D. Intrilligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Volume
II, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Manski, Charles F., (1993) “Identiﬁcation of Endogenous Social Eﬀects: The Reﬂection Problem,”
Review of Economic Studies, 60, 531-542.
Nechyba, Thomas, J., and Robert P. Strauss (1997), “Community Choice and Local Public Ser-
vices: A Discrete Choice Approach,” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 28, 51–73.
Neisheim, Lars (2001), “Equilibrium Sorting of Heterogeneous Consumers across Locations: The-
ory and Empirical Implications,” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, University
of Chicago, August.
Olsen, Edgar O., (1987), ”The Demand and Supply of Housing Service: A Critical Survey of
the Empirical Literature,” 989–1022, in Edwin S. Mills ed., Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Overman, Henry G. (1999), Empirical Studies on the Location of Economic Activity and its Con-
sequences, Ph. Thesis, London School of Economics, September.
Parzen, Emmanuel (1960), Modern Probability Theory and Its Applications, John Wiley and Sons,
New York.
Pollak, Robert A. (1976), “Interdependent Preferences,” American Economic Review, 66, 309–320.
Quigley, John M. (1985), “Consumer Choice of Dwelling, Neighborhood and Public Services,”
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 15, 41–63.
Rapaport, Carol (1997), “Housing Demand and Community Choice: An Empirical Analysis,”
Journal of Urban Economics, 42, 243–260.
Schelling, Thomas C. (1978), Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Norton, New York.
Sieg, Holger, V. Kerry Smith, H. Spencer Banzhaf, and Randy Walsh (2001), “Interjurisdictional
Housing Prices in Locational Equilibrium,” Duke University working paper, July.
Tiebout, Charles M. (1956), “A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditures,” Journal of Political
Economy, 64, 416-424.
Zabel, Jeﬀrey E. (2002), “Continuous Models of Housing Demand,” working paper, Tufts Univer-
sity.
29Table 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS:
American Housing Survey, 1985, 1989, 1993 6372 Observations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Permanent income (log) 10.23844 .7007072
Household heads with high school education, in cluster (fraction) .8435527 .1804457
Nonwhite household heads, in cluster (fraction) .1534013 .2918351
Moved within 5 years, in cluster (fraction) .3399812 .1973038
Mean age of household heads in cluster 51.51979 7.071606
Owners in cluster (fraction) .8577508 .1565115
Mean permanent income among neighbors (log) 10.22315 .5171604
Household heads married, in cluster (fraction) .6312261 .2105387
Mean neighbor household size 2.77464 .6574765
Value of dwelling unit ($) 121370.3 105472.6
Mean age of dwelling unit (years) 37.03751 16.38772
Mean of full baths, neighbor units 1.640929 .6021015
Mean of number of bedrooms, neighbor units 3.020716 .5686652
Mean of garage, neighbor units .7934714 .2845211
Mean of number of rooms, neighbor units 6.419021 1.147638
Air conditioning, neighbor units .7532957 .3023003
Cracks in walls, neighbor units .0340552 .0759873
Holes in walls, neighbor units .0061205 .0302858
Major structural defects, neighbor units .029818 .0700384
Household head schooling (years) 13.26899 3.201469
Size of household 2.761299 1.461693
Log of price 4.416619 .3397629
Price index (Denver MSA=100) 87.80374 30.73653
Age of household head (years) 53.33914 15.89215
Observations in 1985 ( = 1, if in) .2741682 .4461292
Observations in 1989 ( = 1, if in) .3066541 .4611407
Observations in 1993 ( = 1, if in) .4191777 .4934632
Mean predicted housing demand of neighbors 7.018893 .5941519
Table 2: FREQUENCY OF NEIGHBORHOOD CLUSTER SIZES
Units in cluster 5 6 7 8 9 10 > 10
Number of clusters 370 534 665 976 1188 1380 1259
30Table 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS: STF3A, 1980, 1990
Census Tracts 10 Census Tracts
of AHS Data Randomly Chosen, same MSA
Observations 6372 63720
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Unemployment rate .0560639 .0358774 .0753302 .0585049
Unemployment rate £ % non-whites .0136405 .0388313 .0111751 .0358358
Poverty rate .0911387 .0855463 .1435074 .132609
Fraction non-whites .2105101 .2626059 .2821489 .307437
Fraction vacancies .0562693 .0470073 .0760729 .0633072
Fraction owners .6830297 .1781918 .5717286 .2350113
Fraction changed hands in last 5 years .4494394 .1321869 .4902723 .1423698
25-percentile of income (000$) 25.74783 10.96303 21.43516 11.65585
Median income (000$) 38.88759 13.92264 34.01683 14.97174
75-percentile of income (000$) 53.90132 17.69408 48.94414 19.04568
Median age of individuals 31.48832 5.233546 30.47135 5.701576
Median number of bedrooms 2.716573 .5664355 2.487398 .6140009
Median age of dwelling units 27.07454 10.56667 26.98511 11.16377
Fraction complete high school .7301739 .1154721 .6885016 .1488004
Fraction completed · 8 years .0779382 .0667831 .1035867 .0943983
Fraction completed 9 ¸ ¢ ¸ 11 .1293679 .0697979 .1512281 .0858681
Fraction completed 13 ¸ ¢ ¸ 15 .1996313 .0558615 .1882685 .0597654
25-percentile of monthly rent ($) 360.8111 103.831 340.7442 109.0499
Median rent ($) 415.1716 82.46215 398.4197 90.94635
75-percentile of monthly rent ($) 504.857 94.72476 485.6015 104.6676
White £ Fraction non-white .1120112 .1485008 .2302386 .2947284
Non-White £ Fraction non-white .0984989 .2626382 .0519103 .1776417
Dominant race non-white=1, .1442247 .351345 .213371 .4096907
if Percent non-white > :50
31Table 4:
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL FOR CHOICE OF CENSUS TRACT OF RES-
IDENCE: CENSUS TRACT- AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Restricted Model Full Model
Median income -.0043881*
(.00201)
Median income £ income in 1st quartile -.0370789**
(.0045053 )
Median income £ income in 2nd, 3rd quartiles -.0133117**
(.0027746 )




Median rent£ income in 1st quartile -.0007832
(.0005963 )
Median rent£ income in 2nd and 3rd quartile -.0013733**
(.0004271)
Median rent£ income in 4rth quartile -.0007843
( .0005972)
Fraction non-white in tract .4079781**
(.1362475)
White £ Fraction non-white in tract -.7515546**
( .1718891 )




Dominant race £ hh head white -.2153893
(.1182571)
Dominant race £ hh head nonwhite .5873344**
(.189959)
Percent commute less than 20 minutes 1.062809** 1.649353**
(.1531067) (.2828286)
Percent commute less than 20 minutes £ -.6188855
hh head male ( .3247698 )
32Table 4: Continued
Variable Restricted Model Full Model
Poverty rate -2.364136** -3.528244**
(.3407552) (.3755795)
Unemployment rate -5.795275** -8.364291**
(.6992684) (.7560274)
Fraction completed high school .1479637
(.213365)
Fraction completed high school £ -.4033415
hh head at most completed high school (.2585439)
Fraction completed high school £ -4.097066**
hh head not completed high school (.3444453)
Fraction completed high school £ 3.815756**
hh head completed college (.3493936)
Median age indiv in tract -.0109608**
(.0034807)
Median age of house in tract £ -.0393828**
hh h age in 1st quartile (.0082992)
Median age of house in tract £ -.0190462**
hh h age in 2nd, 3rd quartile (.0064139)
Median age of house in tract £ .0134401*
hh h age in 4rth quartile (.0062834 )
Median age of house in tract £hh head married -.0055739
(.0061202 )
33Table 4: Continued
Variable Restricted Model Full Model
Median age of house in tract .0049918**
(.0016002)
Median number of bedrooms .0702261
(.0370069)
Median number of bedrooms £ -.2183383**
hh size in 1st quartile ( .0554643)
Median number of bedrooms £ .0464803
hh size in 2nd, 3rd quartile ( .0834342 )
Median number of bedrooms £ .0084156
hh size in 4rth quartile (.077657)
Median number of bedrooms £ married .2294461**
(.0628937)
Fraction moved within last 5 years -.1868096
(.1978472)
Fraction moved within last 5 years £ .7771453*
hh head age in 1st quartile (.3164385)
Fraction moved within last 5 years £ -.260743
hh head age in 2nd, 3rd quartile (.2560377)
Fraction moved within last 5 years £ .3948822
hh head age in 4rth quartile ( .3225215)
Fraction owners 1.794969 **
(.1435287)
Fraction owners £ 2.430609 **
income in 1st quartile (.2448994)
Fraction owners £ 1.88374 **
income in 2nd, 3rd quartile (.1787906)
Fraction owners £ 1.011504 **
income in 4rth quartile (.2218308)
34Table 4: Continued
Variable Restricted Model Full Model
Fraction vacancies -2.934503**
(.4024874)
Fraction vacancies £ income in 1st quartile -1.118151**
(.6835639)
Fraction vacancies £ income in 2nd, 3rd quartile -3.440058**
(.5881687)
Fraction vacancies £ income in 4rth quartile -7.924718 **
(1.080726)
Log of tract size -.0200521 -.0098041
(.0299843) (.0310739 )
Observations 70092 70092
Log likelihood -14158 -12796
Â2 Signiﬁcance, all variables .0000 .0000
Pseudo R2 .0734 0.1625
35Table 5
ESTIMATION OF DEMAND EQUATION
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Model OLS OLS POOLED POOLED–alt.instr
Cluster information No Yes Yes Yes
Dummy =1, if in, in 1989 .1983** .0306* .0975** .2055**
(0527) (.0125) (.0346) (.0336)
Dummy =1, if in, in 1993 .1566** .0057 .0052 .0229
(.0509) (.0118) (.0312) (.0312)
Mean observed demand by neighbors .8878**
(.0147)
Mean Predicted demand by neighbors .6244** .2101**
(.0542) (.0379)
Log price -.1892* -.0823* -.3019** -.5971**
(.0847) (.0303) (.0841) (.0793)
Log income .4091** .0743** .1207** .1458**
(.0551) (.0163) (.0166) (.0165)
Household size .0120 .0113** .0083* .0071
(.0153) (.0036) (.0041) (.0041)
Completed high school – – – –
(–) (–) (–) (–)
Changed hands within last 5 years – – – –
(–) (– ) (– ) (– )
White – – – –
(–) (–) (–) (– )
Married – – – –
(–) (–) (–) (–)
Mean Log income, neighbors .0263 .2600** .6088**
(.0412) (.0771) (.0702)
Mean household size, cluster -.0156 -.0205 -.0359
(.0095) (.0227) (.0229)
Fraction completed high school, cluster .0098 .0087 .0740
(.0352) (.0852) (.0845)
Note: *, ** indicate signiﬁcant at the 5, 1 per cent signiﬁcance levels. – indicates
suppressed for conﬁdentiality.
36Table 5: CONTINUED
Fraction changed hands in last 5 years, cluster -.0307 -.0542 -.1168*
(.0234) (.0580) (.0586)
Fraction non-white, cluster -.0085 -.0065 -.1168*
(.0278) (.0506) (.0586)
Fraction married, cluster -.0059 -.0989 -.0169
(.0381) (.0926) (.0510)
CONSTANT 3.2691** .1678* .2167 .6128
(.4388) (.1426) (.3526) (.3514)
Heckman Correction Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob F¡ test, Heckman terms 0.0121 0.2988 0.0181 0.0365
Prob F¡ test, own socioeconomics 0.0088 ???? 0.0803 0.1856
Prob F¡ test, cluster socioeconomics ???? 0.0064 0.0000
Observations 764 6372 6372 6372
Observations per cluster 1 8.3 8.3 8.3
R-SQUARE: WITHIN 0.3722 0.0009 0.0099
R-SQUARE: BETWEEN 0.9960 0.6150 0.4896
R-SQUARE: OVERALL 0.2101 0.6456 0.4430 0.3546
S.D of RE 0 .2907 .2911
S.D. Regression Error .5451 .0963 .3276 .3331
Per cent Variance due to RE 0 .4404 .4330
Prob. Â2, random eﬀects .0000 .0000 .0000
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